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This article is about the directors’ due diligence affirma-
tive defense to a claim under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933.1 Section 11 creates a due dili-
gence defense for directors and several categories of
defendants, including accountants and underwriters.2
Anyone who signs a registration statement, was a direc-
tor or was performing similar functions when the registra-
tion statement was filed, or is named in the registration
statement as about to become a director, can be sued under
Section 11 if the registration statement is alleged to have
contained a false or misleading material statement.3
In general, scienter, or state of mind, is not an ele-
ment of a plaintiff ’s Section 11 claim, aside from claims
based on forward-looking statements, which plaintiffs
must prove were made with actual knowledge of their
falsity.4 State of mind, however, is an element of the due
diligence defense. The director defendant must present
evidence of his or her state of mind and knowledge to
establish the defense.5 To establish due diligence, a
director must prove that he or she made a reasonable
investigation of the subject of the challenged statement
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the statement
was true when it was made.6 By establishing the due
diligence defense to a Section 11 claim, a director also
can negate the element of scienter in a Section 10(b)
claim based on the same statement. 
To prove the defense, directors only need to show that
they acted reasonably, not that they acted perfectly.7
What is the Due Diligence Defense?
Section 11(b)(3)(A) provides that a director is not liable
if he or she proves that,
as regards any part of the registration statement not
purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or
extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and
not purporting to be made on the authority of a
public official[’s] document or statement, he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stat-
ed therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading.8
Section 11(c) states the standard for reasonable
investigation and reasonable ground for belief: “In
determining, for the purposes of paragraph (3) of sub-
section (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable
investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the stan-
dard of reasonableness shall be that required of a pru-
dent man in the management of his own property.”9
Courts have held inside directors to a higher standard
of reasonableness than outside directors, on grounds that
inside directors are likely more familiar with the subject
matter and better positioned to identify and investigate
issues.10 The SEC’s Rule 176 also implies a higher stan-
dard of care for inside directors by identifying as a fac-
tor relevant to the determination of the reasonableness
of conduct under Section 11(c), the “presence or
absence of another relationship to the issuer when the
person is a director or proposed director.”11
When to Raise the Due Diligence Defense?
Defendants have the burden of proving the due diligence
defense,12 and therefore the issue often may not be
resolvable on a pleading challenge.13 When directors
answer a Section 11 complaint, they should assert the
due diligence defense and, if appropriate, the reasonable
reliance defense, which is available for “expertised” 
portions of the registration statement. 
The due diligence defense can be decided on 
summary judgment if the court concludes that it is
deciding the legal issue of whether a defendant, on the
basis of undisputed facts, is entitled to the defense.14 If
the court finds that material facts necessary to prove the
defense are in dispute, the motion will fail.15
If the directors dispute that the statement in question
was materially false or misleading, they will move for
summary judgment on those independent grounds or
join in the issuer’s motion. Regardless of the stage of the
case at which they raise the defense, directors should
emphasize that their due diligence defense can succeed
even if the statement was materially false or misleading.
Proving the Due Diligence Defense
The directors should strive to present a coherent, docu-
mented narrative that shows their due diligence. 
Documenting Review Can Pay Dividends Later
A director does not necessarily need to have read the
challenged statement to be liable for the challenged
statement or to prove the due diligence defense.16 A
director who does not remember reading the statement
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at issue, but who can prove that he or she had a reason-
able basis for believing what was stated in the chal-
lenged statement, should succeed on a due diligence
defense. A director who cannot prove that he or she read
the challenged statement, however, may be in a less
favorable position. There will be a hole in his or her nar-
rative of due diligence and reasonable belief. This direc-
tor’s due diligence protection will be by fortune—
because the director’s
knowledge and experi-
ences are consistent with
the challenged state-
ment—rather than by
design. 
Good documentation
will support later efforts
to prove the due diligence
defense. Ideally, directors
would make a practice of
reviewing the registration
statement in as close to
final form as practical. A
cover memorandum to the
draft registration state-
ment could advise direc-
tors to notify a manage-
ment liaison if they have
any questions or con-
cerns. Any such notification, and any responses to a
director, could be documented and distributed to the full
board. The company (and the directors) would retain this
documentation. In-house counsel should consider care-
fully whether this documentation will be maintained as
attorney-client privileged information. Treating the doc-
umentation as privileged could make it difficult to use
in connection with a due diligence defense, unless the
privilege is waived.
These steps may be difficult to schedule during the
short time frames in which registration statements often
are prepared or otherwise not practical in all settings.
Use of even some of these measures, however, could
strengthen a later due diligence defense by decreasing or
eliminating the likelihood that directors are unable to
reconstruct why it was reasonable for them to believe
the challenged statement was true when made.
The directors may need to refresh their recollection
from minutes, emails, or other documentation of atten-
dance at meetings and review of documents. By docu-
menting when and how they reviewed the registration
statements, the directors will find it easier to prove what
they actually did, instead of having to describe what they
“usually” do in connection with a registration statement
or what they “probably” did.
Proving Grounds for Believing a Statement to Be True
Directors must prove that they believed the statement
was true and that they had reasonable grounds for that
belief when the statement was made. There are a num-
ber of possible grounds for a director’s reasonable belief
that something was true. 
First, a director may rely on the director’s experi-
ence and familiarity with the issuer. This expertise
needs to have a demonstrable link to the statement. It
may not be enough, on its own, for the director to refer
generally to a lengthy tenure with the company.
Instead, the director should cite and document particu-
lar experiences and activities that were a part of the
director’s knowledge base when the director read the
registration statement or when the statement was
made.17 So, for example, asserting that the director had
been involved in discussions about the general topics
at issue in the case—for example, that the director gen-
erally had been aware of product quality control meas-
ures—will not be as effective as proving that the direc-
tor received specific reports and attended specific or
regularly scheduled meetings in which the director
learned of, for example, low defect rates with the prod-
uct at issue. 
Second, a director should be able to rely on relevant
knowledge of the industry. Familiarity with the industry
was, for instance, a factor in the SEC’s 1998 proposed
amendment to Rule 176 pertaining to the due diligence
defense for underwriters. Under the proposed rule, an
underwriter’s consultation of a research analyst familiar
with the industry would have been evidence in favor of a
conclusion that the underwriter acted reasonably.18 A
similar rationale should apply to directors’ familiarity
with the industry in question.
Third, a director may rely on nonexperts, such as offi-
cers and executives.19 An outside director may have an
easier time making this showing than an inside director,
because of the outside director’s possible lower level of
familiarity with the particular sources and items of
information available within the company.20
Fourth, a director may rely on an expert, such as an
accountant or investment banker if the director did not
believe, and did not have grounds to believe, that the
statements attributable to the expert were untrue or
misleading.21 Section 11(b)(3)(C) creates this “reason-
able reliance” defense. There are limits to who quali-
fies as an expert and how much of the registration
statement can be “expertised.” For example, a director
generally will not be able to invoke this defense by
claiming that the director relied on inside and outside
counsel’s expertise in drafting registration statements.22
A director may rely on the portion of the registration
statement prepared by an accountant as “expertised,”
Directors must 
prove that they
believed the 
statement was 
true and that they
had reasonable
grounds for that
belief when the 
statement was made.
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but not on other sections of the registration statement
that happen to refer to financial matters.23 Reliance on
audited financial statements included in the registra-
tion statement will usually be reasonable as a matter of
law, unless these statements contain serious “red flags”
or discrepancies.24 Reports on unaudited financial
statements are not considered “expertised” and are
therefore subject to the reasonable investigation
requirement.25
Finally, other witnesses may be helpful to a director’s
due diligence defense. In their depositions, others may
establish that they reviewed the statements at issue with
the director or presented information supporting the
director’s belief that the statement was true not long
before the registration statement was filed.
Conclusion
The due diligence defense illustrates the saying that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Directors
and their counsel should be mindful of the benefits that
some time and careful documentation in the run-up to
the filing of a registration statement can yield in a later
Section 11 lawsuit.Z
Tony Rodriguez is a partner and Karen Petroski is an
associate at Morrison & Foerster LLP in San Francisco,
where they are members of the firm’s Securities
Litigation, Enforcement, and White Collar practice
group.
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